AT THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN DETERRENCE a circumscribed capability analisys

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, launched on 24 February 2022, has vividly reasserted the possibility of a large scale, high intensity conventional conflict on European soil. The sheer mass of equipment, materiel and weapon systems deployed, employed and lost by both belligerents; the volume of ammunition of every type, calibre and range expended; as well as the enormous rate of human and material attrition endured by both sides, combined with the catastrophic level of destruction generated by nearly four years of hostilities, have demonstrated, beyond any reasonable doubt, the fundamental importance for European countries of possessing an adequate military instrument for deterrence and defence. The Russian invasion and the violent continuation of the fighting taking place just beyond the eastern flank of the Atlantic Alliance, together with what now appears to be an increasingly articulated hybrid campaign against its Member States, have underscored the tangible nature of the threat posed to the security of the Old Continent by a severely deteriorated strategic environment, marked by competitive dynamics and prone to conflict escalation.

In this context, the in depth analysis of the lessons identified and learned from the Russo-Ukrainian battlefield, essential for updating the doctrine, organization, capabilities and technologies of European Armed Forces in order to address new potential operational scenarios, and in particular the return of high intensity conventional warfighting, has been complemented by a positive and significant reassessment of the crucial enabling role played by a European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) capable of innovating and producing rapidly and at scale. These are two intimately complementary adaptation processes, essential for renewing a continental military-industrial sector that, as a whole, has for over thirty years been sized and oriented to the planning and conduct of low intensity out of area missions, at most against asymmetric opponents. However, due to financial, industrial, acquisition, and training factors, these processes tend to require extended timelines, thereby necessitating an assessment of the potential readiness of a European military apparatus to deter, and, as an extrema ratio, to delay, halt, and repel hostile acts of limited duration and scope by a peer competitor.

The industrial mobilization toward a wartime economy implemented by the Russian Federation to support the war effort in Ukraine provides indeed all the conditions for Moscow to rebuild, within three to five years, a combat power reinforced by the significant operational experience gained over four years of hostilities, suitable for sustaining local offensive operations against limited objectives within what the Kremlin perceives as its Western strategic periphery. This possibility, if coordinated with Russia’s reiterated willingness to challenge and test Euro-Atlantic resolve through active measures, including misinformation, disinformation, cyberattacks, suspicious overflights of critical infrastructure, sabotage, and blatant violations of allied airspace, is far from marginal. In this scenario, the explicit strategic posture review long underway in the United States, primarily focused on the Indo-Pacific region and the near continent security of the Americas, makes the European segment of Atlantic deterrence even more critical.

Nevertheless, the prospect of a military confrontation with a peer competitor entails capability requirements suitable for disrupting and degrading the main components of the adversary’s overall combat power. Likewise, denying and interdicting enemy capabilities, particularly in the initial phases, would be vital for the conduct of subsequent operational stages. In the specific case of NATO’s European members, the most concrete and plausible territorial-proximity threat to integrated security is represented by an actor capable of projecting military capabilities heavily centred on the predominant employment of land forces. As a result, it is assumed that the adversary would possess an overwhelming quantitative superiority in this domain, to which the response, from a doctrinal standpoint, would unfold in accordance with the tenets of Air-Land Battle and its subsequent evolutions, which are characterized by the tactical centrality attributed to the air domain. According to this approach, the best chances of success lie in restoring air superiority, which enables the operational denial of the adversary (A2/AD – Anti-Access/Area Denial), and then exploiting the resulting advantage to conduct long range strikes deep into enemy territory, neutralizing High Value Targets (HVT).

A realistic assessment of capability requirements, based on current doctrinal paradigms and applied to a potential air‑land engagement against a peer competitor, together with the most informed possible comparison between them and the qualitatively and quantitatively measurable combat power currently deployable by European Armed Forces, makes it possible to identify areas of shortfall or excessive dependence on U.S. military assets. The purpose is to highlight those domains in which existing delays should be addressed as a priority within the broader process of updating and strengthening Europe’s deterrence and defence posture. With this aim in mind, the present Focus Report concentrates specifically on the set of capabilities that enable the imposition of an uneven confrontation on the adversary, allowing for its dislocation and degradation prior to close‑contact manoeuvre and contributing in shaping the battlespace to the advantage of friendly forces.