Elections in Bangladesh: domestic and regional consequences
On 12 February, Bangladesh held its first elections since the student riots of summer 2024, which led to the fall of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. Of the 300 single-member seats in the Jatiya Sangsad, the national unicameral parliament, the alliance led by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) won 212 seats, 209 of which were won by the BNP alone, exceeding the 151 seats needed for a majority. The Jamaat-e-Islami (JIB) and the Bangladesh Citizen Party (BCP), which led the 11-party alliance, managed to secure 68 and 6 seats respectively, while the coalition as a whole won 77 seats. In addition, 50 seats reserved for women will be allocated proportionally based on the number of MPs elected by the various parties. Almost 60% of the more than 127 million voters participated in the election process, up from 42% in 2024, likely reflecting a renewed climate of democratic confidence, civic engagement, and stability.
The result of the 11-party alliance was primarily affected by the absence of recognisable leadership. In fact, the Chief Advisor to the interim Government, Muhammad Yunus, a potential frontrunner, decided to maintain a role as guarantor without assuming political leadership. In terms of individual actors, the JIB could also have suffered from a controversial reputation associated with its role during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 and its alignment to Islamabad. In addition, the low national profile of its leader, Shafiqur Rahman, and his views on the traditional role of women, which may have been reflected in the absence of female candidates on the party’s lists, could have negatively affected the electoral process. Nevertheless, the main surprise within the coalition concerns the BCP, which, despite having played a leading role in the 2024 protests and having assumed important positions in the interim Government, it failed to translate the political capital of the student movements into electoral consensus. Indeed, a significant part of its base perceived the decision to ally itself with a historical player in national politics, such as the JIB, as inconsistent with its original promise to overcome the logic of traditional politics. Added to this was the organisational element of the coalition: the electoral compromise with Jamaat led to a drastic reduction in the BCP’s presence in constituencies, from its initial intention to ensure its national electoral footprint to limited participation in 30 constituencies, thereby contributing to its political downsizing.
As for the winner of this electoral contest, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party has managed to establish itself as a reliable player in the country’s democratic reconstruction. It is possible that voters, sensitive to issues such as corruption, high inflation, economic development, and job creation, placed their trust in a tried-and-tested party, founded in 1978 and already established at the national level, which was therefore perceived as a reassuring option. In this sense, the BNP focused its electoral programme on support for the poorest families, the introduction of a 10-year limit on the Prime Minister’s tenure, economic recovery through foreign investment,and, finally, strong anti-corruption measures. In addition to the popularity of its proposals, the party could count on the historical legacy embodied by its leader, Tarique Rahman, who returned to Bangladesh last December after seventeen years in exile. The BNP President was able to rely on the political weight of his family, primarily his mother, Khaleda Zia, Hasina’s long-time rival, and his father, Ziaur Rahman, a former President of the country. Finally, another potentially decisive factor is the likely convergence of segments of the electorate traditionally associated with the Awami League, a party that Yunus excluded from the electoral process by invoking anti-terrorism legislation.
On the domestic political front, five days after the vote, Rahman took office as Prime Minister, officially replacing Yunus as head of the Government. Under his leadership, the Executive could move towards restoring the previous political structure that existed prior to Hasina’s 2011 electoral reforms, which centralised Government control over the electoral process, weakening democratic safeguards and limiting political competition. In fact, parallel to these elections, a referendum was held on the implementation of the ‘July Charter’, which was approved by 68%. The reform package aims to strengthen democratic mechanisms and prevent authoritarian tendencies. In this sense, the changes provide for the creation of new constitutional bodies, a bicameral Parliament with an upper house with powers over constitutional amendments, term limits for the Prime Minister, and a strengthening of presidential powers, as well as a broader set of around thirty statutory reforms. A second important issue that the government will have to address is the country’s economy. In fact, the textile industry, which accounts for about 80% of Bangladesh’s exports and over 10% of its GDP, is experiencing a challenging phase, recording a decline in exports for six consecutive months due to US tariffs and political instability following the fall of Sheikh Hasina’s government in 2024. Overall, this sector employs nearly four million workers, mostly women, and supports the income of millions of families. In this context, factory owners are calling for political stability, wage reforms, a resumption of credit, and competitive energy costs to revive production. As a result, the government could focus, on the one hand, on reviving the sector and, on the other, on gradually diversifying the economy to reduce dependence on textiles.
In terms of foreign policy, Rahman has announced his intention to recalibrate Bangladesh’s international partnerships to attract more foreign investments without excessive alignment with any single power, marking a break with Hasina’s approach, which had traditionally been close to New Delhi. Despite structural interdependence with India, evidenced by stable bilateral trade of around $13.5 billion and India’s role in energy supplies, relations cooled after Hasina’s fall. Further, they stiffened following India’s protection of the former Prime Minister in exile. This development opens up the possibility of progressive diversification in regional relations, reflected in the potential rapprochement with Pakistan, historically limited by the legacy of the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War. If the new administration confirms this line, today, Islamabad could become the subject of increased economic exchanges and diplomatic cooperation with Dhaka, also in the wake of the opening initiated by Yunus’ interim government and negotiations for the acquisition of JF-17 aircraft, the multi-role fighter jointly developed with China. In fact, Beijing could emerge as the principal beneficiary of the downsizing of relations with New Delhi. As Bangladesh’s largest trading partner, with annual trade volume of approximately $18 billion, China has developed a strong dependence on Chinese imports and has intensified its investments in the country since Hasina’s fall, thereby consolidating its position as a stable and predictable economic partner. This trajectory is causing concern in the United States, which is keen to contain Chinese expansion. With this in mind, shortly before the elections, Washington signed a trade agreement with Dhaka that reduces reciprocal tariffs to 19% and provides exemptions for certain textile products, while, on the security front, it has expressed its intention to offer alternative defence systems in lieu of Chinese supplies.
Overall, the 12 February elections mark a phase of structural transition in Bangladesh, with the BNP’s victory signaling that the population seeks greater political stability and institutional normalisation. Domestically, the new executive will have to manage the constitutional reform process to redefine the balance of powers and address an economic model marked by significant vulnerabilities due to the dependence on the textile sector, which is critical yet in crisis, and the need for production diversification. Externally, the Rahman government will have to address the issue of recalibrating the regional balances between India, Pakistan, China, and the United States. The Rahman government’s ability to coordinate these guidelines will determine the possibility of consolidating the democratic transition and stabilising the country in the medium term, while avoiding new dynamics of internal polarisation and unbalanced external dependencies.