The Horn of Africa between Saudi-Emirati rivalry
The Horn of Africa is as the main arena of competition between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Beyond tensions linked to the worsening of the Yemeni crisis, particularly the clashes in December 2025 between the southern movement, supported by Abu Dhabi, and the formally recognized government backed by Riyadh, the two Gulf monarchies identify the region, comprising Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Somalia, as a strategic opportunity to pursue multiple interests. Among these, particular importance is attached to the supply of resources, especially in the agri-food sector, and the control and protection of major maritime trade routes.
With regard to the first aspect, both Gulf countries aim to transform the Horn of Africa into their primary agri-food supply hub. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the International Fund for Agricultural Development’s data, import dependence stands at between 80% and 90% for the UAE and between 70% and 80% for Saudi Arabia. This vulnerability stems from unfavorable structural conditions, including freshwater scarcity, limited availability of arable land, and a desert climate, compounded by demographic and tourism growth that increases domestic demand.
As for maritime route control, the strategic importance of the Horn is explained by its geographic position. The region’s coastlines allow control over the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which connects the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea and represents a crucial chokepoint for global trade, through which between 10% and 12% of global maritime traffic passes.
To achieve these objectives and project their influence in East Africa, Abu Dhabi and Riyadh adopt different strategies. The UAE favors a pragmatic and flexible approach, primarily based on supporting non-state actors and subnational authorities, in contrast to central governments. This strategy enables Abu Dhabi to operate more rapidly and consolidate its presence in politically fragmented contexts, maximizing the strategic return on its investments. Saudi Arabia, by contrast, prioritizes strengthening official governments and engaging with their institutions, with the aim of promoting long-term political and institutional stability. Both Gulf states consolidate their presence in the Horn through a combination of tools, including infrastructure investments, military cooperation, and the development of logistical hubs.
From an economic standpoint, the UAE is one of the leading investors in Africa, ranking fourth after China, the European Union, and the United States. In 2024, Emirates investments reached $59.4 billion, while bilateral trade with Africa hit $107 billion, marking a 28% increase compared to the previous year. This engagement also extends to the technological sector, as demonstrated by the AI Development Initiative, which foresees $1 billion in investments aimed at integrating advanced technologies into education, agriculture, and infrastructure, with the goal of consolidating the UAE’s role as a global innovation hub.
At the same time, Saudi Arabia continues its path of economic diversification in line with Vision 2030, launched in 2016. However, its financial engagement in Africa remains more limited than that of the UAE: in 2024, Saudi investments stood at $25.6 billion, roughly half of Abu Dhabi’s. This gap reflects not only a quantitative but also a qualitative difference: while the UAE operates through dynamic and assertive holdings such as DP World and AD Ports, Riyadh favors more selective and institutional initiatives, oriented toward the long term and the stabilization of the Red Sea region.
These differing strategic features become particularly evident when analyzing the individual scenarios within the Horn of Africa.
In Somalia, a country deeply marked by internal fragmentation, the differences between the two approaches are very clear. Saudi Arabia supports the unity of the Somali federal government, prioritizing dialogue and concluding agreements with its institutions. Riyadh directs its funding mainly toward the implementation and construction of new infrastructure, as well as the development of the agri-food sector, which helps strengthen its supply chain. An example of such cooperation is a joint agreement signed in July 2025 for the construction of 200 housing units, along with healthcare and educational facilities, for flood victims in the southern city of Kismayo. This cooperation was further strengthened last February through a maritime transport agreement aimed at modernizing port infrastructure and consolidating the strategic axis between the two capitals, as well as a memorandum of understanding on military and defense cooperation, marking a significant step in Somalia’s regional strategy.
This alignment with Saudi Arabia is also explained by the Somali government’s decision to cancel all agreements in force with the UAE, in response to what it perceived as increasing interference by Abu Dhabi in the country’s fragile internal balance. The UAE, in fact, has operated by supporting sub-state entities such as Puntland and Somaliland.
The first one, while formally remaining within the federal framework, enjoys a high degree of operational autonomy and is exposed to external influence dynamics, as demonstrated by the creation of the Puntland Maritime Police Force, established, trained, and financed by the UAE. This initiative aimed to exercise control over the strategic port of Bosaso, for which, already in 2017, a 30-year concession worth approximately $336 million had been signed between Puntland and P&O Ports, a subsidiary of the Emirati state giant DP World.
Even more explicit is the support for Somaliland, a territory that unilaterally declared independence in 1991 and functions de facto as an independent state. In this perspective, it represents a privileged interlocutor for the UAE’s strategic projection, contributing to reshaping the geopolitical balance of the Horn of Africa. The scale of these investments is evident in the acquisition in 2016 of the Berbera port terminals by DP World, later expanded with a total investment of $442 million. By 2024, this operation had outlined a strategic axis between Somaliland, Ethiopia, and the UAE, based on an agreement involving the transfer of rights over portions of Somaliland’s exclusive economic zone to Ethiopia in exchange for recognition of its independence, thereby strengthening both the entity’s international legitimacy and the Emirati presence in the region.
Unlike its strategy in Somalia, the UAE maintains relations in Ethiopia primarily with state institutions in Addis Ababa, departing from its support for non-state actors. This divergence is justified by the absence of sub-state entities with real economic, political, and military autonomy comparable to Somaliland or armed groups such as Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces, making the central government a more solid and functional interlocutor for Abu Dhabi’s interests.
The foundations of this relationship date back to 2013, with the signing of a memorandum of understanding that established a joint ministerial committee aimed at implementing cooperation in political, economic, technological, and security fields. Bilateral relations accelerated further from 2018, coinciding with the election of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. He promoted a strong privatization policy, establishing an advisory council tasked with overseeing the opening of major state-owned enterprises to private and foreign investors. Within this reform framework, the UAE announced a major $3 billion financial support package, including $2 billion in direct investments and $1 billion deposited at the National Bank of Ethiopia to address chronic foreign currency shortages. At the same time, a bilateral labor agreement was signed to establish a legal framework for employing Ethiopian citizens in the UAE, ensuring the protection of their rights and encouraging regular migration flows over undocumented employment.
Although Ethiopia has concluded similar labor mobility agreements with Saudi Arabia, relations with Riyadh have only recently intensified, mainly through economic and commercial instruments such as the Saudi-Ethiopian Business Council. However, the depth of Saudi Arabia’s ties with Egypt and Sudan represents a source of diplomatic complexity: the bitter disputes over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), strongly opposed by Cairo and Khartoum, make Ethiopia a particularly sensitive geopolitical arena for Saudi diplomacy.
Another Horn of Africa scenario shaped by Gulf competition is Eritrea, although there has been a gradual and marked disengagement by the UAE in the area. Over the past decade, Abu Dhabi had developed a functional relationship with Asmara, culminating in a 2015 strategic agreement within the context of Emirati involvement in the Saudi-led coalition against the Houthis. This agreement allowed the UAE to establish a military and naval base at the port of Assab in exchange for economic compensation and fuel supplies to Eritrea. However, despite the port’s tactical value, the Emirati presence gradually diminished, leading to a complete withdrawal in 2021.
This retreat opened space for Saudi Arabia, which in the same year, within the broader framework of Vision 2030, invested billions of dollars in the development of Eritrean port infrastructure. This move enabled Riyadh to consolidate its influence in the Red Sea and deepen diplomatic ties with the regime of Isaias Afwerki. For Eritrea, strengthening ties with Saudi Arabia not only responds to economic logic but also serves as a key geopolitical deterrent against pressure from Ethiopia, enhancing Asmara’s resilience in regional dynamics.
The final crucial scenario in the Horn of Africa where UAE–Saudi competition unfolds is Djibouti. Here, relations with Gulf powers have followed opposite trajectories, shifting from a traumatic break with Abu Dhabi to a gradual and structured rapprochement with Riyadh.
The partnership with the UAE began in 2004, leading in 2006 to a 30-year concession agreement for the construction and management of the modern Doraleh terminal, inaugurated in 2008. Despite initial success, significant legal disputes emerged between 2012 and 2017 due to corruption allegations and contractual clauses deemed excessively unbalanced by the Djiboutian government. The crisis culminated in 2018, when Djibouti unilaterally terminated DP World’s concession for the Doraleh Container Terminal. Authorities accused the Emirati partner of deliberately slowing the port’s development to favor its Jebel Ali hub and imposing clauses detrimental to national sovereignty. Despite international rulings condemning Djibouti to compensation for unlawful expropriation, the country retained control of the terminal, transferring management to a state-owned company and forging new strategic partnerships with China. In response, DP World shifted its operational focus and investments to the nearby port of Berbera in Somaliland.
By contrast, Saudi Arabia has maintained stable relations, intensifying its presence as the UAE withdrew. Bilateral ties gained momentum in April 2017 with a memorandum establishing the Saudi-Djiboutian Business Council, aimed at strengthening economic and logistical-infrastructural cooperation. Between 2020 and 2025, Riyadh consolidated its position through trade cooperation programs and maritime transport agreements, partly to counter Chinese influence.
Between 2024 and 2025, the strategic relationship deepened further with long-term agreements, including the creation of a Saudi logistics zone within Djibouti port under a 92-year concession. This area is set to become a key hub for expanding Saudi exports to African markets. Additionally, in 2025, a 30-year concession agreement between the Djibouti Ports and Free Zones Authority and Red Sea Gateway Terminal for the management and development of the port of Tadjourah marked a major step in Saudi strategy to dominate Red Sea trade routes and integrate Djibouti into its regional logistics architecture.
Overall, there is a growing need for Saudi Arabia and the UAE to expand their projection beyond the Middle East to consolidate control over strategic corridors around the Arabian Peninsula, including key Red Sea maritime routes. The Saudi approach, focused on stability and mediation, contrasts with the UAE’s more assertive financial posture. However, Riyadh risks negative perceptions of its extractive policies in countries such as Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, which could undermine its regional ambitions.
In this complex context, the Horn of Africa is not only a space for the projection of intra-Gulf dynamics but also a testing ground for the geopolitical ambitions of both powers. The competition between Saudi Arabia and the UAE risks further exacerbating political fragmentation in the region, turning tools of development and cooperation into competing levers of influence. In the long term, the ability to balance security, development, and respect for local dynamics will determine the sustainability of their presence in a region where the stakes involve the strategic balance of the entire Red Sea system.