Middle Corridor: connectivity and competition in the Euro-Asian space
On February 6, the European Commission published a study mapping investment needs along the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor (TCTC), known as the Middle Corridor, which connects Europe to China via Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Central Asian Countries. The document represents the political formalization of a structural change: the Middle Corridor is now considered a strategic Infrastructure for the European Union, part of the Global Gateway logic and the redefinition of Euro-Asian supply chains. The importance of this Corridor lies in its role as a tool through which the European Union seeks to build strategic diversification networks.
Before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, 86% of rail traffic between the European Union and China travelled along the Northern Route via Russia, while alternative routes through the Caucasus and Central Asia remained marginal. In 2023, following the start of the Russian Ukrainian war, trade volumes along the Northern Corridor fell by about half, and part of the shift was directed towards the Middle Corridor, which recorded an increase of 89% in 2023 and 70% in 2024. One advantage of this Corridor is timing. The trans-Caspian route offers transit times between European ports and Asian destinations of 12-15 days, compared to 30-40 days for sea shipments. The Southern Corridor, based mainly on passage through the Suez Canal, has also shown structural vulnerabilities highlighted by Houthi’s attacks in the Red Sea. In this context, the search for alternative routes is not only an economic choice but a strategic necessity, and the Trans-Caspian Corridor could become a structural axis of Eurasian economic integration. This potential is supported by data: by 2030, the Middle Corridor could triple its traffic volumes to 11 million tons, while additional export potential by 2035 could reach 2.4 million tons of petroleum products, 6 million tons of ferrous metals, and 7 million tons of products.
With this in mind, the February 6 study maps infrastructure and regulatory needs along the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor and aims to provide a technical basis for guiding governments, international financial institutions, and the private sector. The document identifies physical and regulatory bottlenecks along the Corridor, especially in the Caucasus segment and the Caspian basin, where port capacity, maritime fleet, and multimodal interoperability have ample room for improvement. Secondly, it highlights that physical infrastructure is still insufficient, given the limited presence of complete digitalization of procedures, regulatory harmonization, and administrative capacity building. In addition, there is the difficulty of national public budgets in supporting the necessary investments. The success of the Corridor therefore depends on public-private partnerships, the involvement of international financial institutions, and attractive conditions for logistics operators. In this context, the Caucasus section is of primary importance, whose full functionality is closely linked to the degree of stability and cooperation between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. In this regard, the progress made in regional dialogue represents the ideal condition for ensuring maximum security and continuity for trade flows along the axis.
Brussels’ main objective is to reduce the vulnerability of its supply chains and expand the number of available partners and routes, seeking greater economic diversification. And that’s why investing along the Trans-Caspian Corridor would mean strengthening an alternative route connecting Europe and Asia without passing through Russia, allowing the European Union to manage its trade relationship with China in a more controlled and resilient manner. The European Union already plays a significant economic role in the region, being the leading trading partner for many Black Sea Countries and the second largest for several Central Asian countries. Furthermore, the European Union considers the Black Sea to be a bridge to Asia, crucial for access to energy and critical raw materials, as well as for food security and global trade.
Despite this, it is clear that investments are not distributed evenly but are concentrated in certain key Countries that play a specific role in the logistics chain. In the infrastructure sector, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan emerge as the main beneficiaries in terms of financial volumes. Astana, in particular, concentrates investments exceeding €5 billion on strategic railway projects alone. This priority reflects the Country’s central position as the eastern gateway to the Middle Corridor and the main hub between China and the Caspian basin. Indeed, without a significant increase in railway capacity on Kazakh territory, the Corridor would not be able to support the structural expansion of Euro-Asian flows. The Country is not only a transit segment, but also the section that determines the scalability of the Middle Corridor: controlling Kazakhstan’s rail capacity means influencing the maximum volume of trade integration between Europe and Asia along this route. The case of Azerbaijan is different: although it has lower volumes than the two large Central Asian Countries, investments are targeted at key infrastructure, such as the port of Baku, road connections to Georgia, and maritime capacity in the Caspian Sea. These elements represent the main physical bottlenecks of the Corridor. Azerbaijan’s importance, therefore, stands out more in terms of quality than quantity, given its control of the most sensitive segment of the route, where the East-West axis (China-EU), the potential North-South axis (Russia-Iran-India), and energy connections to the Black Sea converge.
As regards the energy sector, Turkey is the Country with the highest concentration of systemic projects, consolidating its position as an energy hub between the Caucasus and the European Union and strengthening its autonomy from Russia. Although not directly part of the Corridor, Ukraine is absorbing massive investments for the resilience and reconstruction of its energy system, in line with the European political priority of supporting its security and integration into the continental energy market. Here too, Azerbaijan occupies a strategic position. In addition to renewable energy projects and the submarine electricity corridor in the Black Sea, which strengthens its role as an energy exporter to the European Union, the Country also plays a role as a supplier of hydrocarbons. In this regard, in January 2026, Azerbaijan exported 2.643 million tons of crude oil and petroleum products, worth more than 1.238 billion dollars, marking a 23.6% increase in volume compared to the previous year. Among other things, Italy confirmed its position as the leading importer of Azerbaijani oil, purchasing 1.848 million tons in January alone. These figures indicate that the energy relationship between Baku and Brussels is not only promising but already structural.
In this picture, the Middle Corridor is not just a logistics project, but a network of infrastructure that attempts to redraw dependencies and power relations. For the European Union, investing in the Corridor means, first and foremost, reducing its vulnerability to Russia. However, Moscow retains its influence in the Countries along the route and could seek to hinder the consolidation of the trans-Caspian route, exploit it indirectly to circumvent sanctions, and strengthen the North-South axis through the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC).
Furthermore, the Corridor is part of the broader competition between China and the United States. For Beijing, it would represent an opportunity to consolidate access to European markets through routes that do not depend on Russian infrastructure and that mitigate the impact of American pressure. For the EU, the Middle Corridor offers the possibility of structuring its interdependence with China in a more autonomous way, avoiding both subordination to routes controlled by Moscow and automatic alignment with the US strategy of containing Beijing. As for the US, until recently it remained a relatively marginal player in the Corridor, while recognizing Central Asia as an important theater in the current corridor wars. Nevertheless, Kazakh President Tokayev’s visit to Washington in February 2026 signals a possible change in attitude. Indeed, investment agreements worth hundreds of millions of dollars with US companies highlight how the region has become more visible on the US strategic horizon.
Finally, Iran appears to be observing the development of the Corridor with increasing attention, aware that the full operation of this route would risk further reducing its centrality in Euro-Asian trade flows. On the other hand, the current situation and the limitations of Iranian infrastructure continue to undermine the attractiveness of the Islamic Republic as a transit route between Asia and Europe. In this context, the success of the Middle Corridor would represent a further factor of isolation. It is no coincidence that Iran has sought to strengthen alternative routes, in particular the International North-South Transport Corridor, in an attempt to preserve a significant role in trade flows between Europe and Asia.