Ukraine Year IV

The war between Russia and Ukraine has entered its fourth year, or perhaps it would be more accurate to say its twelfth. While it is true that Russia’s large-scale invasion began on 24 February 2022, it is equally true that the Kremlin’s political interference and low- and medium-intensity military activities against Kyiv began systematically in April 2014. The distinction between dates and the different ways of counting the years of conflict are not just a stylistic exercise or an academic quarrel. On the contrary, from an analytical point of view, recognizing that we are facing a decade-long conflict that entered a phase of greater intensity in 2022 offers a different perspective for the development of future forecasting.

Indeed, the Russian-Ukrainian war could be categorised into two distinct phases: the first, from 2014 to 2022, was one of interdiction, while the second, from 2022 to the present day, has been one of radicalisation. In the aftermath of the Revolution of Dignity and the ousting of pro-Russian President Yanukovych, the Kremlin opted for a containment strategy consisting of the immediate annexation of Crimea and unofficial military support for Ukrainian militias in Donbas to prevent Kyiv from sliding into the Euro-Atlantic orbit and transitioning to a domestic and foreign political system that marked a break with Russia’s colonial and Soviet past. Moscow had essentially succeeded in its aim, freezing the conflict in the emptiness of the Minsk Agreements and hoping that Europe and the United States would lose interest in the issue and that, as a result, Ukraine would abandon all hope for a future of reform, liberalisation, and independence from the sphere of influence of its powerful neighbour. However, pro-European and Atlanticist aspirations in Kyiv did not subside and, aided by a convergence of international factors such as the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, the hasty Western withdrawal from Afghanistan, and Russia’s need to externalise an internal crisis that was about to explode, Ukraine’s project of emancipation from the Russian yoke was vigorously revived between 2021 and early 2022. This time, Moscow’s threats of force and continued disruptive actions in the two separatist puppet republics of Luhansk and Donetsk were not enough. Invasion became necessary to try to shake up the Western-centric global order and regain control of what was considered a rebellious province of the empire.

The war has now entered its fourth year of this second phase, characterised by significantly higher levels of intensity over a longer period, with no acceptable room for negotiation. The risk of a conventional continental escalation in Europe continues to grow month by month. At the same time, neither the Kremlin nor Kyiv appears willing to back down or reach a compromise, despite mounting concerns about economic and military sustainability.

The longer the conflict continues, the more the room for manoeuvre and options available to the belligerents and their respective factions supporting them are reduced. The general impression is that the conflict will reach a turning point in the near future. The first branch could lead to a hypothetical freeze or a reduction in the intensity of hostilities, allowing all parties to catch their breath and resume the conflict in the coming months or years after adequate preparation. The second branch, on the other hand, leads directly to a continental escalation, with the direct involvement of European countries and unpredictable outcomes from all perspectives. In both cases, analysis of the strategic factors suggests that the second phase of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is nearing its end. This means that the strategies and methods of action adopted so far are becoming obsolete and that new ones will take their place. The only certainty is that peace in Europe is still a long way off.