Iranian President Raisi's visit to China: between expectations and reality
Between Feb. 14 and 16, a delegation from the Islamic Republic of Iran led by the President Ebrahim Raisi paid an official state visit to China. The delegation was composed by six Ministers, the Central Bank Governor, and the official in charge for nuclear negotiations. The purpose of the travel was to revitalize the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership that the two countries signed in March 2021, which included investments worth 400 billion in exchange for oil to be realized over the next 25 years.
The Beijing meeting comes at a very complex juncture for the Islamic Republic, which has been going through bitter anti-regime protests for the past five months. Although the visit was holding a lot of expectations, it failed to address them all. The parties signed 20 cooperation agreements in the sector of trade, tourism, crisis management and information technology. However, there was no practical remark about wider projects or meaningful acceleration for the implementation of foreign direct investment from China to Iran.
The desire to carry out the travel is connected to the current relevance of the Sino-Iranian relations for Tehran. Notably, after the imposition of international sanctions in 2018, the People’s Republic of China became the top market for Iranian exports, which totaled $9.2 billion last year. However, these figures do not consider oil exports, which many international analysis institutes say continue, transiting through third states in order to circumvent restrictions. Meanwhile, imports from China have enabled Iran to keep some economic sectors active and competitive, including the automotive industry.
In such context, Tehran has boosted its so called “Look East” foreign policy strategy, seeking to strength partnership with the purpose to break its international isolation. Consequently, the importance of Beijing in the Middle East has progressively grown. Iran and China, specifically, signed a 25-year bilateral strategic partnership, and the Islamic Republic has engaged talks to become member of the Chinese-driven Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Moreover, Beijing is a key actor for the recovery of Iranian nuclear negotiations. Therefore, the presence within the delegation of the Chief Negotiator might serve such purpose.
From the Chinese perspective, Iran is seen as an important player in the broader strategy of challenging the U.S.-led international system. However, for Beijing, the bilateral relations seem to be subordinated to the evolution of the scenarios both in the Middle East and globally. In particular, the Chinese diplomatic action in the Gulf is characterized by the research of a balancing between those actors in conflict among them. Accordingly, as showed by Xi Jinping travel to Riyad, the Chinese relation with Saudi Arabia keeps playing a fundamental role for Beijing’s foreign policy, and by contrast representing a symptom of attrition with Iran. Although strategic, the relation with Teheran is for China functional to serve its broader interests, for these reasons it seems unlikely in the short-medium period to assist to a change of behavior, as desired by Iranians.
