India-Canada: the agreement that reshapes New Delhi’s energy security
On 2 March 2026, on the sidelines of Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s official visit to New Delhi, India and Canada signed a framework agreement on civil nuclear energy. If implemented, the Canadian company Cameco would supply the Asian country with approximately 10 million kilograms of uranium between 2027 and 2035, with an estimated value of €1.63 billion. Furthermore, the agreement provides for cooperation on small modular reactors (SMRs) and next-generation reactors, constituting part of a broader revival of bilateral relations following several years of diplomatic tensions, with the aim of increasing bilateral trade to $50 billion by 2030.
The agreement carries significant strategic weight when viewed within India’s energy landscape context. Thus, New Delhi’s energy production heavily relies on fossil fuels, which meet over two-thirds of the national needs. The energy source that leaves the country most exposed to external vulnerabilities is crude oil, which accounts for around a quarter of the energy mix, with 87% of that being imported. Specifically, Russia has historically been India’s main oil supplier, accounting for up to 35% of imports, but US sanctions in 2025 are said to have prompted New Delhi to shift its focus towards Middle Eastern suppliers. A similar dependency applies to liquefied natural gas (LNG): although LNG, almost half of which is imported, accounts for only 6% of the energy mix, it is a critical input for fertilisers, the chemical industry and electricity generation during peak demand periods, with around 75% of supplies coming from the Persian Gulf in 2024.
This situation has been exacerbated by the outbreak of the Iran War on 28 February 2026 and the subsequent blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. Oil supplies from the Gulf, which at the start of the year would have accounted for around half of India’s crude oil imports, have fallen sharply, making once again Russian oil attractive to the Modi government. Washington has responded by granting New Delhi a special 60-day extension for the purchase of Russian crude oil, ensuring operational continuity for Indian refineries. Furthermore, on the LNG front, the attacks are reported to have damaged Qatar’s production infrastructure, from which India imports around a third of its gas, resulting in an estimated reduction in imports for New Delhi of $10 billion annually and a recovery time for Qatar’s national system of between three and five years.
It is against this backdrop of systemic vulnerability that nuclear power could emerge as a structural solution. Although it currently accounts for around 3% of India’s electricity mix, with 24 reactors in operation, New Delhi aims to increase its nuclear capacity twelvefold by 2047. The advantages are clear: stable production, independent of fluctuations in international commodity markets, and low carbon intensity. The critical issue, however, remains fuel. Indeed, India does not have sufficient uranium reserves to meet the needs of its reactor fleet. It is against this backdrop that the significance of the agreement with Canada emerges, which would resolve this exposure to external factors, guaranteeing predictable supplies for existing reactors as well as those under construction, and opening up opportunities for technological cooperation on advanced reactors. This agreement with Ottawa would therefore not be an isolated incident, but rather a building block of a structured energy diversification strategy, aimed at building a portfolio resilient to international tensions and less dependent on critical partnerships.