Decoding Operation Sindoor: Prospects for India-Pakistan Confrontation

At 09:35 p.m. Italian time, 01:05 a.m. local time, the Indian Armed Forces carried out a limited strike operation, named Sindoor, targeting a total of 21 sites located mainly beyond the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir, in Pakistan’s Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces. The operation, which lasted approximately 25 minutes in total, primarily involved the use of Indian Air Force aircraft operating within national airspace, from which long-range precision stand-off strike munitions were launched. These targeted only selected camps and infrastructure reportedly linked, according to Indian authorities, to the militant groups *Jaish-e-Mohammed *(JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), which New Delhi holds responsible for the 22 April terrorist attack on Hindu tourists in Baisaran Valley, Jammu and Kashmir. Specifically, Indian security services have attributed the Pahalgam attack, which resulted in 26 fatalities, to The Resistance Front (TRF), a proxy linked to LeT and also implicated in the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Among the sites targeted by Indian forces was the city of Muridke in Punjab province, where Indian intelligence identified the presence of JeM leader Masood Azhar. However, he may have escaped the strike, while some members of his family are believed to have been killed.

The highly limited nature of the bombing campaign, both in terms of duration and magnitude, despite at least 25 reported fatalities and about twice as many wounded, and the absence of any Pakistani military facilities among the targets, indicate a carefully calibrated operation aimed at minimising the immediate risk of escalation. The current flow of information concerning the operation is subject to the rules of the “fog of war”, with both sides engaging in a large-scale campaign of misinformation and disinformation, seeking, on the one hand, to downplay the adversary’s capabilities and, on the other hand, to amplify their own. Against this background, India’s use of advanced stand-off munitions with minimal collateral damage, along with the deployment of unspecified unmanned aerial systems, is countered by Islamabad’s progressive claims of having downed an increasing number of Indian aircraft during the operation. The probable loss of some fixed-wing assets, particularly if not due to technical malfunctions, would have occurred within Indian airspace, suggesting a plausible Pakistani cross-border defensive counter-air action using air-to-air missiles.

Notwithstanding the assertiveness in the strategic communication adopted by Islamabad and the artillery exchanges along the entire LoC in Kashmir, which remain consistent with a mere intensification of the recurring positional engagements that have characterised the period since the 22 April attack, a retaliation from Pakistan seems inevitable, though not imminent. However, the realisation of such retaliation presents a dilemma, not so much regarding the methods, but the nature of the selected targets, as New Delhi did not strike military infrastructures, thus negating the grounds for a symmetrical response.

The current scenario, therefore, reproduces at least in part some elements that have already emerged during the rather limited clashes, in terms of scope and duration, that took place between India and Pakistan in 2016 and especially in 2019. In the latter case, the two Countries focused on achieving outcomes that could be leveraged on their respective domestic fronts, a dynamic that may recur in this instance. At that time, the Indian response took the form of a limited-strike operation in Balakot, which did not lead to large-scale conflict between the two nations. In the current context, Operation Sindoor, although relatively more extensive in scope than in 2019, nonetheless served to confirm India’s intention to respond militarily to terrorist attacks, thereby attempting to re-establish deterrence and underscoring the absence of a distinction between actions carried out by Kashmiri groups and conventional operations attributed to Pakistani forces.

Contextually, a counter-response from Islamabad seems likely, as the Country’s Armed Forces, particularly its leadership, most notably the Chief of Army Staff, General Asim Munir, appear unable to manage a further loss of credibility without significant risks, especially after the popular protests witnessed in recent years within the framework of the repression campaign against the opposition led by Imran Khan.

Barring the risk of an incident, any limitation of the conflict will also depend largely on the pressure exerted by external actors, notably the United States, China, Iran, and the Gulf States. In 2019, it was precisely Washington’s intervention that proved crucial in keeping the confrontation contained. Not coincidentally, after signalling discreet support for its Indian partner, the U.S. administration, through Secretary of State and Acting National Security Advisor Marco Rubio, has initiated intensive talks with both sides, urging restraint. At the moment, none of the major global players, including China, appear interested in an India–Pakistan conflict, particularly given the inherent unpredictability of a large-scale confrontation between nuclear powers. Overall, the current hostilities do not yet display features suggesting an escalation. Nevertheless, neither side is willing to emerge from the dispute in a position of weakness, whether for domestic political considerations or reasons of international image. This makes it impossible to entirely rule out a conflict scenario. Moreover, both governments are keen to avoid becoming targets of their respective opposition fronts, should they be perceived as displaying weakness.

Military developments aside, relations between India and Pakistan after what happened are likely to enter a new phase in which hypotheses of dialogue and rapprochement seem unthinkable. Prolonged tension, moreover, risks turning South Asia, more than it already is, into one of the privileged theatres of the broader confrontation between the United States and China. While the former, in fact, could face increasing difficulty in building a relatively balanced relationship between the two sides, the latter could exploit the circumstances to impose ever-increasing pressure on its Indian rival. At the regional level, the confrontation calls into question the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, whose leadership may try to take advantage of the Pakistani “distraction” to strengthen direct and indirect support for active militancy against Islamabad along the shared border. The security situation in Pakistani province of Balochistan, already very precarious at present, could also be further aggravated if the parties fail to de-escalate tensions in the short to medium term, a scenario that looks highly likely.