Strengthening the Strategic Partnership between India and Japan
On Friday 3 July, the 16th India–Japan Annual Summit has concluded, the first since Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi took office. The summit appears to have reaffirmed the close cooperation between the two countries, through the strengthening of the Special Strategic Partnership and the outlining of bilateral policies designed to promote mutual development. Specifically, the talks explored several key issues in the strategic relationship between Tokyo and New Delhi: from cooperation on security and artificial intelligence to the evolution of recent regional and global dynamics. What emerges from the meeting, however, would appear to go beyond mere cooperation, outlining the establishment of a strategic alignment aimed, on the one hand, at supporting mutual development and, on the other, at mitigating China’s growing strategic projection in the East and South China Seas, a source of concern for both countries.
It is no coincidence, in fact, that one of the main themes of the meeting was precisely the strengthening of their respective doctrines on freedom of navigation, through the integration of Japan’s FOIP (Free and Open Indo-Pacific) strategy with India’s IPOI (Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative) and MAHASAGAR initiatives. In this context, the implementation of last year’s Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation would appear to demonstrate a desire to move beyond a purely diplomatic phase of the relationship, elevating it to the level of interoperability. On the one hand, the decision-making mechanism would be institutionalised through the scheduling of the fourth round of ‘2+2’ ministerial dialogues (Foreign Affairs and Defence) by the end of the year. On the other hand, operational readiness and technical synergy would be tested directly on the field, as already demonstrated by the positive results of the JAIMEX25 exercise, Tokyo’s participation in the 2026 International Fleet Review and the progress of the UNICORN project in naval communication systems.
Furthermore, New Delhi has welcomed Japan’s new stance on the revision of the three principles governing the transfer of defence equipment and technology, a development that would suggest a greater willingness to coordinate in this field. The recent changes made by the Japanese government confirm Tokyo’s growing interest in strengthening its own security, including through closer bilateral relations with regional partners. Similarly, Japan has recently concluded talks with Indonesia, which culminated in the sharing of sensitive maritime information and a commitment to finalise agreements on the sale of Japanese destroyers to Jakarta, as well as with the Philippines, sharing the aim of delimiting their respective exclusive economic zones and drawing an effective red line for Beijing along the first islands chain.
For its part, over the past two years, India has pursued a slow and gradual normalisation of relations with Beijing. Although these relations remain volatile, they are showing slight signs of openness in the economic sphere, particularly with regard to the transfer of technological know-how in the automotive sector and greater liberalisation of Chinese direct investment in India, which until recently was subject to very stringent controls. This has not, however, diminished New Delhi’s interest in ensuring a more favourable security balance in the Indo-Pacific region, counterbalancing Chinese dominance in the region. The agreements for the sale of BrahMos missiles concluded with Indonesia, Vietnam and the Philippines in the first half of 2026 can be interpreted in this light. For both countries, these needs are likely to be driven by the United States’ military repositioning towards the Middle East and the Trump Administration’s consequent gradual disengagement from the region, as well as by persistent Chinese pressure in the Taiwan Strait, which also involves further claims to disputed territories, particularly with Japan, such as the Senkaku Islands.
A further factor of interest, particularly significant given the instability that has characterised the Persian Gulf, is the extreme vulnerability of Tokyo and New Delhi’s energy supply chains. Although India and Japan are particularly energy-intensive countries, their domestic production remains rather limited, leaving them dependent on external supplies and highly exposed to broader geopolitical dynamics, as demonstrated by the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. In this regard, the launch of the Japan-India Cooperative Biogas for Growth Initiative (CBG Initiative) during the Summit proved significant; this is a new project aimed at increasing biogas production in light of India’s target to establish 1,000 biogas plants and organic fertiliser plants across the country. Both countries, in fact, consider it necessary to diversify their energy supply sources as much as possible, both in terms of suppliers and the raw materials used, given that Japan and India are dependent on crude oil and natural gas from the Gulf to the tune of 82.8% and 68.3% respectively, according to 2025 data. Therefore, a project of this kind would enable India to take further steps towards realising the ‘Viksit Bharat’ national development programme, whilst allowing Japan to export its technological know-how to the Indian market.
For some time now, Tokyo has been seeking to gain access to the vast South Asian market. It is therefore not surprising that the central aim of the economic discussions during the Summit was to enhance the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) by boosting private investment through ‘fast-track’ mechanisms such as the India-Japan Industrial Competitiveness Partnership (IJICP). Furthermore, as set out in the India–Japan Joint Vision for the Next Decade, the parties’ aim is to reach a target of 61 billion dollars in Japanese investment in India. Japan’s interest is not accidental, nor is it the only such interest at an international level, as demonstrated by the conclusion of negotiations on the Free Trade Agreement between India and the European Union in early 2026. The increasingly frequent and sudden episodes of instability on the international stage, combined with the need to revitalise a stagnant economy facing significant domestic challenges, ranging from demographic decline to a reduction in purchasing power, would appear to be the main reasons behind the country’s intentions, as well as an opportunity to diversify trade partnerships and ensure the security of supply chains.
Another key element of the discussions was the use of artificial intelligence (AI), which is crucial for expanding collaboration between the two countries by extending its use across a wide range of areas, in line with the Hiroshima AI Process and the New Delhi Declaration on AI Impact, which concern codes of conduct for AI systems. Among the areas mentioned, the most significant are cybersecurity and the securing of strategic supply chains, as well as digital infrastructure. In this context, the convening of the Japan–India AI Strategic Dialogue was welcomed, and the Joint Statement on AI Cooperation was adopted to further consolidate the progress made under the Japan–India AI Cooperation Initiative. The Japanese artificial intelligence market ranks among the leading players on the global stage, capitalising on its long-standing technological leadership in the fields of robotics, electronics and industrial automation. Today, Japan appears to have moved beyond the embryonic stage of pure research to usher in a new era of pragmatic application, aimed at harnessing the potential of AI in terms of economic efficiency and quality standards in strategic sectors such as healthcare, finance, mobility and advanced manufacturing. Such aspects, combined with India’s commitment to educating young people in STEM subjects, demonstrate that cooperation in this area would be beneficial for both countries, particularly in light of the commitment expressed during the 2025 Summit to promote the movement of workers from India to Japan by 2030, with a target of around 50,000 skilled IT workers.
Overall, the summit has therefore confirmed the emergence of a pragmatic strategic convergence, aimed at fostering stability in the Indo-Pacific and counterbalancing China’s presence. The architecture emerging from this summit appears to reflect that of minilateralism: the forging of bilateral and trilateral agreements with key players in the ASEAN region, such as Indonesia and the Philippines, demonstrates how Tokyo and New Delhi intend to act as the two cornerstones of a flexible network of regional containment and stabilisation. Furthermore, the inclusion of critical issues in the dialogues between the two powers, such as supply chain security, artificial intelligence and the energy transition, signals a convergence that goes beyond the purely diplomatic dimension of their relations. It is therefore reasonable to expect ever deeper cooperation between the two powers in the short and medium term.