Security diplomacy and energy diversification in the Indo-Pacific

From 8 to 10 July, on the occasion of the third India–Australia Annual Summit, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Australia, where he was received in Melbourne by Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, This meeting takes place during a particularly busy period for the foreign policy of New Delhi and the Indo-Pacific countries, as over the past two weeks Modi has also held talks with his Japanese and New Zealand counterparts, Sanae Takaichi and Christopher Luxon, as well as with Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto. Such a network of bilateral meetings would seem to indicate a broad and shared regional desire to maintain a strong focus on developments affecting the Indo-Pacific, an area of extreme strategic importance in contemporary geopolitical dynamics. It is no coincidence, in fact, that the recurring themes of these meetings have been precisely cooperation – aimed at ensuring freedom of navigation and security in the Indo-Pacific, securing supply chains and energy diversification.

The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz caused widespread disruption to India, being a country with extremely high energy consumption, which is set to be approximately 68.3% dependent on natural gas from the Gulf by 2025. Consequently, energy diversification is increasingly seen not as a choice, rather as a necessity. It is therefore not surprising that, as early as the beginning of 2026, India was already taking steps in this direction, concluding a framework agreement on civil nuclear energy with Canada. Should this agreement be implemented, the Canadian company Cameco would undertake to supply the Asian nation with approximately 10 million kilograms of uranium between 2027 and 2035, with an estimated value of 1.63 billion euros. The agreement also provides for forms of cooperation relating to small modular reactors (SMRs) and the development of next-generation reactors. This could mark a new chapter in India’s energy journey, recently bolstered by the SHANTI Act, which was passed by Parliament in December 2025. The bill consolidates and modernises India’s nuclear legal framework by allowing private sector participation – albeit limited – in the nuclear sector under regulatory oversight, whilst strengthening statutory regulation by granting statutory recognition to the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB).

Of particular significance, therefore, was the conclusion of administrative agreements regarding the export of uranium from Canberra to New Delhi for civilian purposes, which would allow private Australian mining entities involved in uranium extraction to enter into commercial contracts with Indian private-sector companies. For some time now, New Delhi has in fact shown an interest in Australian uranium reserves, which account for around 28 per cent of global supply and represent a significant asset in helping to achieve the target of 100 gigawatts of nuclear power capacity by 2047. As for Australia, the aim is to diversify its trading partners as much as possible, with a view to reducing economic dependence on Beijing, the leading importer of Australian goods.

In this regard, Canberra and New Delhi have reaffirmed their mutual commitment to strengthening the resilience of energy supply chains through deeper regional cooperation and an acceleration of the green transition. In this perspective, a central role could be given to India’s proposal for the Global Biofuels Alliance (GBA), a multilateral alliance bringing together governments, international organisations and industry. With 34 countries and 14 international organisations as members, including Italy, Japan and the United States, the GBA aims to position biofuels as a key solution for the global energy transition and to contribute to socio-economic growth.

For what concerns security, particularly in the maritime sphere, India appears to be seeking to assume the role of a central partner, positioning itself as the geographical terminus of a corridor which, extending from Japan, aims to monitor developments along the first island chain. This stance is taking shape in response to US disengagement from the Indo-Pacific region, which, due to the escalation in the Strait of Hormuz, has compelled states in the area to adopt a principle of burden-sharing in the defence sector. Although this approach is directed at all of Washington’s partners, in the Indo-Pacific context it takes on key significance at a time when regional actors such as India, Japan and Australia find themselves defending their common interests more independently than in the past. It is therefore no surprise that this theme has been a recurring feature in all the meetings in which New Delhi has recently played a leading role. Indeed, from Japan to New Zealand, there have been numerous references to improving defence interoperability in the region, in line with forums such as the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) and ASEAN, which are central players in shaping the Indo-Pacific architecture. Beijing’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea and the East China Sea – manifested through frequent military exercises along the Taiwan Strait and claims to disputed areas – is also a factor that must be monitored with the utmost caution, and to which the various countries in the region are seeking to respond in different ways.

Canberra, for example, has been engaged in recent months in implementing a series of agreements with its neighbours. Of particular significance in this context is the launch of negotiations between Australia and the Solomon Islands on a comprehensive strategic treaty, aimed at strengthening cooperation in crucial areas such as security and energy supply. This initiative represents a strategic repositioning following the appointment of Prime Minister Wale in Honiara, who has expressed his intention to review the security pact signed with China in 2022, with a view to ensuring greater transparency regarding the terms of the agreement. This trend also explains the formalisation of the economic and security agreement between Australia and Vanuatu, which would preclude the establishment of foreign military infrastructure or bases within the archipelago’s borders. The treaty also provides for an Australian allocation of 500 million dollars and obliges Vanuatu to preserve the integrity of its port, digital and energy networks from any form of external interference or militarisation.

In this context, broader security cooperation with New Delhi would therefore mark a further step forward in the network of bilateral agreements with Canberra, as well as a key alliance by virtue of the relations it maintains with other actors in the region. During his recent visit to Indonesia, Modi signed an agreement with Prabowo Subianto for the sale of the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile system and the Astra air-to-air missile, and also expressed interest in collaborating on the integrated development of the Indonesian port of Sabang. Such a partnership would be particularly significant given the port’s geographical location, situated near the Indian Andaman and Nicobar Islands and the provinces of the island of Sumatra – a factor that would ensure greater control over the Strait of Malacca, a vital chokepoint for Beijing’s interests. Furthermore, Indonesia has recently concluded agreements with Japan, following Tokyo’s strategic repositioning on the transfer of defence equipment and technology, concerning the purchase of Japanese destroyers – a development that would appear to indicate Jakarta’s intention to contribute actively to regional stability.

In conclusion, the trends highlighted above point to the gradual emergence of a dynamic framework in the Indo-Pacific region, based on a network of bilateral agreements aimed at safeguarding the shared interests of regional actors. This development forms part of the context of recent changes in international energy markets, the White House’s renewed interest in the Middle East, and the People’s Republic of China’s possible exploitation of the scaling back of the US security umbrella. It is in this light that India’s recent intense activity can be interpreted, as can that of other governments in the Pacific region, which perceive the ability to integrate maritime security, industrial strength and the resilience of logistics and energy supply chains as the key factors set to determine the regional balance of power.