Critical resources and regional security: the escalation of the conflict in Myanmar

Between 15 and 19 June, Myanmar’s newly elected President, Min Aung Hlaing, travelled to China to hold diplomatic talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping, a key ally in the country’s political landscape. This visit forms part of an extremely busy period for Naypyidaw’s foreign policy, which has also seen bilateral meetings with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, held from 30 May to 3 June. At the heart of the dialogue with China and India lies the desire to further strengthen bilateral cooperation in various strategic areas, including trade and economic ties, defence and security, and border management. These developments would appear to signal a potential shift in policy for New Delhi and Beijing, aimed at scaling back ties with regional armed militias. The primary objective of the two regional powers seems to be to promote the stabilisation of a country that is strategic to their national interests, by consolidating relations with the new government in Naypyidaw. Meetings of this kind therefore reflect the new Myanmar government’s desire to emerge from the state of near-total international isolation caused by the 2021 coup, by drawing the two major regional powers closer. It is no coincidence, in fact, that such a rapprochement is taking place in the wake of a new offensive aimed at altering the balance of power within the country.

On 25 May, the ruling military junta launched a massive offensive in areas of particular strategic importance due to the presence of deposits of critical raw materials, as well as their advantageous position within supply chains and their proximity to neighbouring countries. These are the Chin region, on the border with India; the Karen region, near Thailand; and the Kachin region, on the Chinese border. The latter, in particular, is the area of greatest interest since, according to data from the General Administration of Customs of China (GACC), it is home to around 370 heavy rare-earth mining sites, with at least 2,700 wells for solvent extraction in the towns of Chipwi and Momauk. Specifically, this is the source of approximately 60 per cent of China’s rare earth supplies, estimated at around 4.2 billion dollars for the period from 2017 to 2024, of which 3.6 billion dollars was generated in the post-coup period alone. Nevertheless, these areas lie outside the government’s authority, as they are predominantly controlled by various ethnic groups that have long opposed the central government, giving the country a fragmented and unstable image.

Furthermore, these regions are of interest to foreign actors such as India, within the framework of the ‘Neighbourhood First’, ‘Act East’, ‘Indo-Pacific’ and ‘MAHASAGAR’ initiatives, and China, whose relations with Naypyidaw have undergone continuous evolution, leading to strategic alliances as well as political and economic influence, both over the junta and the militias operating in the territory. Beijing’s strategic interests, however, are not limited to the Kachin region alone, but must be understood within the broader framework of the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), a project aimed at linking the Burmese port of Kyaukpyu to the town of Muse, situated near the Chinese border, effectively crossing the entire country and the various factions that control it. This is a project with an estimated value of 15 billion dollars, which has been under development since 2018 and would offer Beijing a new gateway to the Indian Ocean, enabling it to bypass the Malacca Dilemma, and which is of vital importance for energy supplies to the Yunnan region of China, thanks to gas and oil pipelines running from the port of Kyaukpyu to the city of Kunming. Following a setback caused by internal instability in recent years, this project now appears to be gaining momentum once again, with Beijing and Naypyidaw having recently committed to further implementing the CMEC, focusing on projects such as the port of Kyaukpyu and the Muse–Mandalay railway network.

In order to protect these interests, China has, over time, maintained relations with both the military junta and the resistance. However, a significant shift in approach occurred following Operation 1027 in 2023, through which the armed militias extended their control over further areas, threatening Chinese mining operations in the Kachin mines. Since then, the Chinese authorities have cut off supplies of fuel and ammunition and have put pressure on certain ethnic armed organisations to sign a ceasefire with the junta. At the same time, there has been an intensification of Beijing’s diplomatic efforts, providing logistical support to the government in order to prevent further territorial losses and bring a degree of predictability to the conflict. It should also be noted that Chinese mining activities are highly damaging to the environment and a source of tension among ethnic groups in the area, generating discontent within the ranks of the Kachin Independence Army, which controls the region of the same name. The Kachin Independence Army appears to have also made contact with India during 2025, perhaps precisely because of China’s shift in stance in favour of the junta. It is therefore not surprising that this group is not among those invited to the 100-day peace talks, launched last April by the new military leader Ye Win Oo, and that, to date, it remains the main target of government attacks aimed at regaining control of the strategic area. In light of this, achieving lasting stability in Myanmar remains a distant goal, but one in which China and India are key players. It is likely that we will see an ever-increasing presence in the area, particularly from China, whose cooperation with Naypyidaw aims to extend to all levels, as has emerged from recent meetings.